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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1846 
_____________ 
 
OMAR NORVIL WHYLIE LEWIN,  
 AKA Omar Lewin,  
 AKA Omar N. Lewin,  
 AKA Lewin Omard,  
 AKA Lewin N. Oman, 
                                Petitioner  
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 
                                  Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A041-353-654) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Mirlande Tadal 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2018 
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Before:   JORDAN, ROTH, Circuit Judges and MARIANI*, 
District Judge. 
 
(Filed: March 20, 2018) 
_______________ 
 
Joseph C. Hohenstein 
190 N. Independence Mall West 
Suite 602 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Jefferson B. Sessions, III 
Anna Juarez 
Anthony J. Messuri 
United States Department of Justice 
 Office of Immigration Litigation  
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
                                              
 * Honorable Robert D. Mariani, United States District 
Court Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting 
by designation. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This immigration case raises a single question:  
whether the petitioner’s conviction under New Jersey’s 
Receiving Stolen Property Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-
7(a), constitutes an “aggravated felony” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 66 Stat. 163, as 
amended.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  We conclude that it 
does and, accordingly, will deny the petition for review. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Omar Norvil Whylie Lewin, a native and citizen of 
Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 1987 as a legal 
permanent resident.  In 2000, Lewin was convicted of 
receiving stolen property in the third degree, in violation of 
New Jersey law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7(a), and was 
sentenced to five years of probation.  Seven years later, 
following a finding that he violated the terms of his probation, 
Lewin was resentenced to a term of four years of 
imprisonment.1  Another seven years later, Lewin received a 
                                              
1 Lewin states that his probation violation stemmed 
from a miscommunication regarding his request to transfer 
his probation when he moved from New Jersey to Georgia, 
which resulted in a bench warrant on the 2000 stolen property 
offense.  He alleges “serious defects” in the violation of 
probation proceedings that resulted in his resentencing.  
(Opening Br. at 5.)  Those allegations are the subject of a 
collateral attack, pending in the New Jersey Superior Court.  
State v. Lewin, No. A-0713-1671.  Lewin filed a motion to 
hold the present matter in abeyance, pending the resolution of 
that case, and we denied that motion. 
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Notice to Appear, charging him as removable pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).   
 
An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that Lewin is 
removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony 
under § 1101(a)(43)(G), based on his 2000 New Jersey 
conviction for receipt of stolen property and later 
resentencing, and that the conviction also barred him from 
relief in the form of cancellation of removal.  The IJ therefore 
pretermitted Lewin’s application for cancellation of removal.  
Lewin then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was 
denied.  His case was ultimately transferred to a second IJ, 
who adopted the original IJ’s conclusions regarding Lewin’s 
removability and ineligibility for cancellation of removal.   
 
Lewin appealed that decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), arguing that his New Jersey 
conviction did not categorically constitute an aggravated 
felony under § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the IJ had prematurely 
pretermitted his application for cancellation of removal under 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  It 
too concluded that, because Lewin’s New Jersey receipt of 
stolen property conviction categorically constituted an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), he is 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.  It thus dismissed 
Lewin’s appeal.  He responded with this petition for review.2 
                                              
2 The second IJ also concluded, and the BIA affirmed, 
that Lewin was ineligible for other forms of relief from 
removal.  Lewin does not contest those determinations in the 
petition before us.   
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II. DISCUSSION3 
 
Lewin’s petition challenges only the sufficiency of the 
mens rea element of his New Jersey offense:  he says that the 
minimum mens rea under New Jersey’s § 2C:20-7(a) – 
“believing that [the property] is probably stolen” – renders 
that offense insufficient to categorically constitute an 
aggravated felony under the INA, specifically under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).  He argues that, although the BIA properly 
applied a “strict categorical approach” when determining 
whether his conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 
the INA, it reached the wrong result.  (Opening Br. at 7.) 
                                              
3 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  Because the basis for 
Lewin’s removal and the pretermission of cancellation of 
removal relief is an aggravated felony conviction, our 
jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of 
law” raised in his petition.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Roye v. 
Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Aggravated felony determinations are questions of 
law, which, it is said, we review de novo, Mateo v. Att’y Gen., 
870 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2017), subject to Chevron 
deference principles, Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 205-
06 (3d Cir. 2011).  See Denis, 633 F.3d at 208-09 (stating that 
de novo review is proper in a case involving a pure legal issue 
as to removability, but that granting deference to the BIA’s 
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language 
would also be proper); see also infra n.6.  Because the BIA 
issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than the 
IJ’s decision.  Roye, 693 F.3d at 339. 
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We apply the categorical approach’s element-by-
element analysis to determine whether Lewin’s New Jersey 
receiving stolen property conviction “fits” the generic 
definition of receiving stolen property that is contemplated by 
the INA under § 1101(a)(43)(G).  Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 
F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (employing categorical approach 
for aggravated felony determination).  Lewin’s “actual 
conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry,” and we must “presume 
that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of 
the acts criminalized under the [New Jersey] statute.” 
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  However, “our focus on the 
minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute is not an 
invitation to apply ‘legal imagination’ to the state offense; 
there must be ‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct 
that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.’”  
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted). 
 
Lewin was convicted of receiving stolen property in 
the third degree.  Following the Model Penal Code’s pattern 
definition, M.P.C. § 223.6, New Jersey defines receiving 
stolen property as follows:  “A person is guilty of theft if he 
knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 
is probably stolen.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7(a). 
 
The INA includes a generic theft offense within its list 
of specified aggravated felonies, and it requires that, to fit the 
definition of aggravated felony, the “theft offense (including 
receipt of stolen property) … [must be one] for which the 
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term of imprisonment [is] at least one year[.]”4  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).  The INA itself does not define “theft” or 
“receipt of stolen property,” but an accepted generic 
definition of a “theft offense” is the “taking of property or an 
exercise of control over property without consent with the 
criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of 
ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or 
permanent.”  Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189 
(2007). 
 
The BIA has issued published decisions interpreting 
the requisite “criminal intent” inherent in § 1101(a)(43)(G)’s 
generic receipt of stolen property offense, most recently in 
Matter of Deang, 27 I. & N. Dec. 57 (2017), which post-dated 
the BIA’s decision in Lewin’s case.  In Matter of Deang, the 
BIA addressed whether a state statute governing the receipt of 
certain stolen property (specifically motor vehicles), and 
providing a minimum mens rea of “reason to believe” the 
property at issue was stolen, was sufficient to satisfy the 
criminal intent element of the generic receipt of stolen 
property offense contemplated by the INA.  Construing the 
INA’s generic offense to include as “a necessary element” an 
“intent to deprive the owner of his or her property, ”  id. at 59, 
the BIA concluded that a mens rea amounting only to a 
“reason to believe” the property was stolen did not satisfy that 
intent element.  Id. at 63.  It said, “[w]e cannot infer that a 
violator who received property with a ‘reason to believe’ that 
the property was stolen (or a similar mens rea) intended to 
deprive the true owner of the rights and benefits of 
                                              
4 Lewin does not contest the BIA’s conclusion that his 
2007 resentencing supplied the statutory requirement of a 
minimum term of imprisonment of at least one year.  
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ownership[,]” because a violator “need not be actually aware” 
of an item’s stolen character; rather, the state need only prove 
that a person “should have been aware” that the property was 
stolen, based on the circumstances.  Id. at 59.  The BIA then 
considered other intent elements used in similar federal and 
state statutes, and it held that “the mens rea of ‘knowledge or 
belief’ is an essential element of an aggravated felony receipt 
of stolen property offense under [§ 1101(a)(43)(G).]”5  Id. at 
63.   
                                              
5 In its opinion, the BIA relied, in part, on its survey of 
federal and state statutes in place at the time Congress 
amended the INA to include a “receipt of stolen property” 
offense.  Id. at 59-62.  It stated that, while “21 jurisdictions … 
and one [f]ederal statute used the lesser mental state of 
‘reason to believe’ or something similar[,] … 29 [s]tate 
statutes, 11 [f]ederal statutes, and the Model Penal Code used 
an elevated standard of ‘knowledge or belief’ when 
[§ 1101(a)(43)(G)] was enacted.”  Id. at 62.  “[W]hile not 
dispositive in itself,” the BIA viewed its survey as “lend[ing] 
substantial support to … [the] conclusion that a statute that 
only requires proof that a violator had a ‘reason to believe’ 
that the property received was stolen cannot qualify as an 
aggravated felony receipt of stolen property offense[.]”  Id. at 
62-63.  We express no view on that point, but we do note that 
the BIA properly categorized New Jersey’s receiving stolen 
property statute as an MPC-patterned offense, with a 
“knowledge or belief” element, and that it expressly 
addressed the facial differences between the “knowledge or 
belief” and “reason to believe” standard used in certain 
jurisdictions’ receipt of stolen property statutes.  We therefore 
reject Lewin’s arguments that Matter of Deang is irrelevant.   
Matter of Deang is consistent with the BIA’s decision in 
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The government argues that Matter of Deang 
forecloses Lewin’s argument that New Jersey’s receipt of 
stolen property statute, with its “knowing ... or believing” 
mens rea, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7(a), is insufficient to 
constitute an aggravated felony under the INA.  Lewin 
counters that Matter of Deang is not dispositive and that we 
should not afford it any deference under the principles laid 
out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 (1984).  While the issue of 
Chevron deference to the BIA’s evaluation of criminal 
statutes in light of the INA has generated some controversy 
and confusion,6 we do not need to resolve that issue here.  See 
                                                                                                     
Lewin’s case, and we therefore also reject Lewin’s argument 
that we must remand to the BIA to apply that decision in the 
first instance.   
 
6 See Denis, 633 F.3d at 207-09 (noting confusion 
regarding appropriate degree of Chevron deference to BIA’s 
aggravated felony interpretations, and discussing cases); see 
also Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Canvassing the dozen aggravated felony cases decided by 
this Court, one indisputable and surprising pattern emerges:  
We have never affirmatively deferred to an interpretation by 
the BIA (or an IJ) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), i.e., of whether 
the crime at issue constitutes an aggravated felony.”).  But see 
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating 
that the BIA’s interpretation of “moral turpitude,” as well as 
its determination of whether the underlying criminal statute 
satisfies that definition, were entitled to Chevron deference); 
but see also Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 
2014) (citing Knapik and noting that “[w]hile we do not defer 
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Rojas, 728 F.3d at 207 (citing Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 
201, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2011) (declining to resolve Chevron 
dispute because it would not affect the outcome)).  We agree 
with the BIA’s conclusion that the mens rea element of New 
Jersey’s receiving stolen property statute is categorically 
sufficient to constitute an aggravated felony under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).  Cf. De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
to the BIA’s parsing of the elements of the underlying crime, 
we generally accord deference to the BIA’s determination 
that a certain crime involves moral turpitude when that 
determination is reasonable[,]” but concluding that 
unpublished BIA decisions are not entitled to Chevron 
deference though they may constitute persuasive authority 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
We also question whether, in light of its substantial 
reliance on a survey of other criminal statutes, the BIA’s 
interpretation in Matter of Deang of generic theft under the 
INA’s aggravated felony provision reflects the traditional 
hallmarks of a decision justifying Chevron deference.  Cf. 
Mateo, 870 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he interpretation of criminal 
provisions ‘is a task outside the BIA’s special competence 
and congressional delegation ... [and] very much a part of this 
Court’s competence[.]’” (quoting Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 663 
F.3d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 2011));  I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (reasoning that “judicial deference to 
the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the 
immigration context where officials exercise especially 
sensitive political functions that implicate questions of 
foreign relations” (quotation marks omitted)).  The question is 
immaterial, here, however, because we would reach the same 
decision with or without deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation. 
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633, 637 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting mens rea challenge to 
similar Pennsylvania receiving stolen property statute, 
reasoning that “[a]t a minimum, [the petitioner] was 
convicted of possessing stolen property that he believed 
probably was stolen, a crime that is barely removed from 
possessing stolen property with knowledge that it is stolen”). 
 
Lewin argues that New Jersey’s statute does not meet 
the generic INA definition because it criminalizes conduct 
“that would not result in any deprivation (i.e. a mistaken 
belief in a probable fact that an item was stolen)[,]” but his 
concern is misplaced.  (Opening Br. at 14.)  New Jersey law 
makes it clear that “the State … must prove that the property 
in question was actually stolen.”  State v. Hodde, 858 A.2d 
1126, 1129 (N.J. 2004).  So too is his concern that a 
defendant’s “belief” that the property is probably stolen need 
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  “It is well settled 
that due process requires the State to prove each element of a 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Hill, 974 
A.2d 403, 411 (N.J. 2009); see also id. at 418 (stating that “it 
was the State’s exclusive burden to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt” the defendant’s mens rea); N.J. Model 
Crim. Jury Charges §2C:20-7a (“The third element that the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the 
defendant either knew that the property had been stolen or 
believed that it had probably been stolen at the time the 
defendant received the property … .  Mere proof that the 
property was stolen is not sufficient[.]”).  Indeed, that 
“burden is not only a constitutional mandate, but is also 
codified in [New Jersey Annotated Statute] 2C:1–13(a).”  
State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1214 (N.J. App. Div. 2011). 
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On its face, the New Jersey statute’s language – 
“knowing that [the property] has been stolen, or believing that 
it is probably stolen” – refers to a specific defendant’s 
knowledge or belief, and that element must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7(a); Hill, 974 
A.2d at 411; N.J. Model Crim. Jury Charges §2C:20-7a; see 
also De Leon-Reynoso, 293 F.3d at 636-37 (concluding that 
“belief that the property probably has been stolen speaks to 
the specific defendant’s belief and not the hypothetical 
reasonable person[,]” and noting that “subjective intent is 
generally inferred from objective facts”).  Lewin cites no 
New Jersey case law to substantiate his concern that New 
Jersey courts interpret “belief” under any lesser standard.  At 
most, he raises a theoretical challenge, and that is insufficient.  
Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191.  We therefore conclude the BIA 
correctly determined that his conviction under New Jersey 
law for receiving stolen property constituted an aggravated 
felony under § 1101(a)(43)(G).7   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Lewin’s 
petition for review. 
                                              
7 For similar reasons, Lewin’s reliance on the rule of 
lenity fares no better.  That rule affords relief only in light of 
a “grievous ambiguity[,]” Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 
473 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as recognized in Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 
202, 209 (3d Cir. 2005), and there is none here. 
